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Abstract—We study a problem where wireless service providers
compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in
their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of
service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an
arbitrary number of providers and users as a two-stage multi-
leader-follower game. We prove existence and uniqueness of
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a generic channel
model and a wide class of users’ utility functions. We show
that the competition of resource providers leads to a globally
optimal outcome under mild technical conditions. Most users
will purchase the resource from only one provider at the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. The number of users who connect
to multiple providers at the equilibrium is always smaller than the
number of providers. We also present a decentralized algorithm
that globally converges to the unique system equilibrium with
only local information under mild conditions on the update rates.
Index Terms—Game theory, provider competition, wireless
network, pricing
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the deregulation of the telecommunication industry,
future wireless users are likely to freely choose a provider
(or providers) offering the best tradeoff of parameters. This
is already happening with some public Wi-Fi connections,
where users can connect to wireless access points of their
choice, with usage-based payments and no contracts. Despite
the common presence of a free public wi-fi network, some
users may still choose more expensive providers who offer
better quality of service. Another example of the deregulation
trend is the analog television (UHF) spectrum which was
recently open for unregulated use in the US [1].
In this work, we consider a situation where wireless service
providers compete to sell a limited amount of wireless re-
sources (e.g., frequency bands, time slots, transmission power)
to users who are free to choose their provider(s). We in-
vestigate how providers set prices for the resource, and how
users choose the amount of resource they purchase and from
which providers. The focus of our study is to characterize
the outcome of this interaction. We consider the general
case where different users have different utility functions and
experience different channel conditions to different service
providers.
We model the user-provider interaction as a multi-leader-
follower game (see [2], [3]). The providers announce the
wireless resource prices in the first stage, and the users
announce their demand for the resource in the second stage.
A user may purchase resource from a provider with a poor
channel if the price of the resource is low, or conversely from
an expensive one if the channel is strong. The providers select
their prices to maximize their revenues, keeping in mind the
impact of their prices on the demand of the users.
The contributions of our work are as follows:
• General Heterogeneous Wireless Network Model: We
study a general network model that captures the hetero-
geneity of wireless users and service providers. The users
have different utility functions, the providers have differ-
ent resource constraints, the channel gains between users
and providers are independent and arbitrarily distributed,
and the numbers of users and providers can be arbitrary.
• Unique Socially Optimal Allocation: We first study the
problem of maximizing social welfare under a fairly
general utility function model. We show that when chan-
nel parameters are randomly drawn from continuous
distributions, there exists a unique optimal solution to
the problem with probability 1, despite the non-strict
convexity of the optimization problem.
• Existence, Uniqueness, and Zero Efficiency Loss of Equi-
librium: We further prove existence and uniqueness of
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the two-stage
game, under an easily verifiable sufficient condition on
the users’ utility functions. Moreover, we show that the
unique equilibrium maximizes the social welfare, despite
the selfish nature of the providers and users.
• Primal-Dual Algorithm converging to Equilibrium: We
provide a decentralized algorithm that results in an equi-
librium of the provider competition game. The partici-
pants only need local information during the execution of
this algorithm. Providers only need to know the demand
of the users, while users only need to consider the prices
given by the providers.
We begin by describing the provider competition model
in Section II. In Section III we discuss the socially optimal
resource allocation and in Section IV we analyze the provider
competition game. We define the primal-dual update algorithm
and prove its convergence in Section V. We provide numerical
results and dicussion in Section VI. We discuss the related
work in Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a set J = {1, . . . , J} of service providers and
a set I = {1, . . . , I} of users. Provider j ∈ J maximizes its
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2revenue by selling up to Qj amount of resource to the users.
A user i ∈ I maximizes its payoff by purchasing resources
from one or more providers. The communication can be both
downlink or uplink, as long as users do not interfere with each
other by using orthogonal resources. We model the interaction
as a multi-leader-follower game (see [2], [3]), where providers
are the leaders and users are the followers. We called this
game the provider competition game. We assume that the users
play the game during the coherence time of their channels.
This can be reasonable for a quasi-static network environment
(e.g., users are laptops or smart phones in offices or airports).
This means that the channel gains remain roughly constant
and can be made known to all parties. For example, each
provider collects its channel condition information to each
user, and then broadcasts this information to all users. This
assumption will be relaxed in Section V, where we consider
a decentralized algorithm that results in the same outcome as
the multi-leader-follower game.
A. Provider competition game
The provider competition game consists of two stages. In
the first stage, providers announce prices p = [p1 · · · pJ ],
where pj is the unit resource price charged by provider j. In
the second stage, each user i ∈ I chooses a demand vector
qi = [qi1 · · · qiJ ], where qij is the demand to provider j. We
denote by q = [q1 · · · qI ] the demand vector of all users.
In the second stage where prices p are given, the goal of
user i is to choose qi to maximize its payoff, which is utility
minus payment:
vi(qi,p) = ui
 J∑
j=1
qijcij
− J∑
j=1
pjqij , (1)
where cij is the channel quality offset for the channel between
user i and the base station of provider j (see Example 1 and
Assumption 2), and ui is an increasing and concave utility
function. In the first stage, a provider j chooses price pj
to maximize its revenue pj
∑I
i=1 qij subject to the resource
constraint
∑I
i=1 qij ≤ Qj , by taking into account the demand
of the users in the second stage. We consider linear pricing
with no price discrimination across the users.
Under this model, a user is allowed to purchase from
several providers at the same time. For this to be feasible,
a user’s device might need to have several wireless interfaces.
Mathematically, the solution of this model gives an upper
bound on best performance of any situation where users are
constrained to purchase from one provider alone. Interestingly,
our results show that for most users, i.e. no less than I − J ,
the optimal strategy is to choose exactly one provider.
Next we give a concrete example of how our model is
mapped into a physical wireless system.
Example 1: Consider wireless providers operating on or-
thogonal frequency bands Wj , j ∈ J . Let qij be be the
fraction of time that user i is allowed to transmit exclusively
on the frequency band of provider j, with the constraint∑
i∈Ij qij = 1, j ∈ J . Furthermore, assume that each
user has a peak power constraint Pi. We can then define
cij = Wj log(1 +
Pi|hij |2
σ2ijWj
), where hij is the channel gain and
σ2ij is the Gaussian noise variance for the channel between
user i and network j. In this case, a user’s payoff is the
difference between its utility function (in terms of total rate)
and payments, vi = ui(
∑J
j=1 qijcij)−
∑J
j=1 pjqij .
Although the cij channel quality offset factor represents
channel capacity in Example 1, it can be any increasing
function of the channel strength depending on the specific
application scenario.
Finally, we remark that the problem shares certain similarity
with the multi-path routing problem in a generalized network
flow setting, where each source corresponds to a user and each
link corresponds to a provider. The key difference is that in our
model the user-provider connections have different weights,
which is not the case for the multipath routing problem.
B. Model assumptions
We make the following assumptions throughout this paper:
Assumption 1: (Utility functions): For every user i ∈ I,
ui(x) is differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave in x.
This is a standard way to model elastic data applications in
network literature (see, e.g., [4]).
Assumption 2: (Channel quality offsets and channel gains):
Channel quality offsets cij are drawn independently from
continuous, possibly different utility distributions. In particular
Pr(cij = ckl) = 0 for any i, k ∈ I, j, l ∈ J . The channel
quality offset accounts for the effect that buying the same
amount of resource from different providers typically has
different effects on a user’s quality of service. As Example
1 shows, channel quality offset cij may be a function of
the channel gain hij between user i and provider j. In this
case the assumption is fulfilled if channel gains are drawn
from independent continuous probability distribution (e.g.,
Ralyleigh, Rician, distance-based path-loss model).
Assumption 3: (Atomic and price-taking users): The de-
mand for an atomic user is not infinitely small and can have
an impact on providers’ prices. Precise characterization of this
impact is one of the focuses of this paper. On the other hand,
users are price-takers by the assumption of the two-stage game,
and do not strategically influence prices.
To analyze the properties of the provider competition game,
in Section III we study a related socially optimal resource
allocation problem and show the uniqueness of its solution in
terms of users’ demands. Then, in Section IV, we come back
to the provider competition game. We show that the unique
socially optimal solution solution corresponds to the unique
equilibrium of the provider competition game, in which case
the selfish and strategic behavior of providers and users leads
to zero efficiency loss.
III. SOCIAL OPTIMUM
A. Social welfare maximization
In this section we consider a social welfare problem, which
aims at maximizing the sum of payoffs of all participants,
(users and providers). The social welfare problem is equivalent
3to maximizing the sum of users’ utility functions since the
payments between users and providers cancel out. We show
the uniqueness of its solution in terms of users’ demands. For
clarity of exposition, we define the following notation.
Definition 1: (Effective resource) Let x = [x1 · · · xI ] be
the vector of effective resources, where xi(qi) =
∑J
j=1 qijcij
is a function of user i’s demand qi = [qi1 . . . qiJ ].
The social welfare optimization problem (SWO) is:
SWO : max u(x) =
I∑
i=1
ui (xi) (2)
subject to
J∑
j=1
qijcij = xi i ∈ I (3)
I∑
i=1
qij = Qj , j ∈ J (4)
over qij , xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ J . (5)
We expressed the SWO in terms of two different variables:
effective resource vector x and demand vector q, even though
the problem can be expressed entirely in terms of q. In
particular, a vector q uniquely determines a vector x through
equations (3), i.e. we can write x as x(q). With some abuse
of notation we will write u(q) when we mean u(x(q)).
Lemma 1: The social welfare optimization problem SWO
has a unique optimal solution x∗.
Proof: Since ui(xi) is strictly concave in xi, then u(x) =∑I
i=1 ui(xi) is strictly concave in x. The feasible region
defined by constraints (3)-(5) is convex. Hence, u(x) has a
unique optimal solution x∗ subject to constraints (3)-(5).
B. Uniqueness of the socially optimal demand vector q∗
Even though ui(·)’s are strictly concave in xi, they are
not strictly concave in the demand vector qi. Hence, SWO
is non-strictly concave in q. It is well-known that a non-
strictly concave maximization problem might have several
different global optimal optimizers (several different demand
vectors q in our case) (see e.g. [5],[6]). In particular, one can
choose cij’s, Qj’s, and ui(·)’s in such a way that a demand
maximizing vector q∗ of SWO is not unique. However, we
can show that such cases arise with zero probability whenever
channel offsets factors cij’s are independent random variables
drawn from continuous distributions (see Assumption 2).
In the remainder of this section, we show that SWO has
a unique maximizing demand vector with probability 1. We
begin by proving Lemma 2, which is an intermediate result
stating that any two maximizing demand vectors of SWO must
have different non-zero components. We then observe that any
convex combination of two maximizing demand vectors is also
a maximizing demand vector. Finally, we show that all convex
combinations of maximizing demand vectors have the same
non-zero components, which is a contradiction with Lemma
2. This proves the main result of this section (Theorem 3).
To make our argument precise, we first define the support
set of a demand vector qi as follows.
Definition 2: (Support set): The support set Jˆi(qi) of a
demand vector qi contains the indices of its non-zero entries:
Jˆi(qi) = {j ∈ J : qij > 0}.
Given a demand vector q, the ordered collection of support
sets Jˆ1, Jˆ2, . . . , JˆI is denoted by {Jˆi}Ii=1.
The support set contains providers that user i has strictly
positive demand from.
Lemma 2: Let q∗ be an optimal solution of SWO (a max-
imizing demand vector) and {Jˆi}Ii=1 be the corresponding
collection of support sets. Then, q∗ is almost surely1 the
unique maximizing demand vector corresponding to {Jˆi}Ii=1.
Proof: For a maximizing demand vector q∗, equations
(3)-(5) hold, with
∑J
j=1 q
∗
ij = x
∗
i . To prove the lemma, we
will uniquely construct q∗ from x∗ and {Jˆi}Ii=1.
We can divide the users into two categories. The decided
users purchase from only one provider (|Jˆi| = 1), and the
undecided users from several (|Jˆi| > 1). It is also possible
that some users have zero demand to all providers, but without
loss of generality, we treat such users as decided. Recall that
for all users we have x∗i =
∑J
j=1 q
∗
ijcij . For a decided user
i who purchases only from provider ¯, this reduces to x∗i =
q∗i¯ci¯, and the corresponding unique demand vector is q
∗
i =
[0 · · · 0 x∗ici¯ 0 · · · 0].
For undecided users, finding the unique q∗i is less straight-
forward as there is more than one qi such that
∑
j∈Jˆi qijcij =
x∗i . To show that the demand of undecided users is unique,
we construct the bipartite graph representation (BGR) G of
the undecided users’ support sets as follows. We represent
undecided users by circles, and providers of undecided users
as squares. We place an edge (i, j) between a provider node
j and a user node i if j ∈ Jˆi.
We give an example of a BGR in Fig. 1, where Jˆ1 =
{a, b, c}, Jˆ2 = {b, d}, Jˆ3 = {d, e, f} and Jˆ4 = {b, g}.
1
P1 = x
∗
1
2
P2 = x
∗
2
3
P3
4
q∗4bc4b + q
∗
4gc4g
a
Sa
b
Sb
c
Sc
d
Sd
e
Se
f
Sf
g Sg =
Qg −
∑
i 6=4 q
∗
ig
q∗1a
q∗4b
q∗4g
Fig. 1: Bipartite graph representation
The BGR has the following properties2 (see Fig. 1):
1) The sum of effective resource on all the edges con-
nected to user i is the optimal effective resource x∗i =∑
j∈Jˆi q
∗
ijcij = Pi. Borrowing from coding theory and
with some abuse of terminology, we call Pi the check-
sum of user node i.
2) The sum of all edges connected to provider node j
equals to the difference between the supply Qj and the
1This holds on the probability space defined by the distributions of cij ’s.
2Fig. 1 shows a connected graph, but this need not be the case.
4demand from decided users who connect to provider j:∑
i:(i,j)∈G q
∗
ij = Qj −
∑
i:(i,j)/∈G q
∗
ij = Sj . We call Sj
the check-sum of provider node j.
3) With probability 1, the BGR does not contain any loops.
This is proved in Appendix A-1.
As it is the case in Fig. 1, the number of undecided users
is smaller than the number of providers. This is a direct
consequence of Property 3), and will be proved later.
We can use the BGR to uniquely determine the demands of
undecided users. Here we use Fig. 1 as an illustrative example,
the formal description is given in Appendix A-2. We call this
procedure the BGR decoding algorithm. Consider leaf node (a
node with only one edge) g and edge q∗4g . The BGR implies
that user 4 is the only undecided customer of provider g. Since
the demands of all decided users have been determined, then
we know that q∗4g = Sg = Qg−
∑
i 6=4 q
∗
ig . We can then remove
edge q∗4g and node g from the BGR, and update the check-sum
value of node 4 to P4 = x∗4−q∗4gc4g . Now consider node 4 and
edge q∗4b. Since edge q
∗
4b is now the only edge connecting with
user node 4, we have q∗4bc4b = P4 and hence q
∗
4b = P4/c4b.
Next we can consider node a, e, or f , and so on. Property
3) is crucial in this procedure since it guarantees that we can
always find a leaf node in the reduced graph.
In each step of the algorithm, we determine the unique value
of q∗ij associated with the edge of one leaf. This value is
independent of the order in which we pick the leaf nodes,
as seen from Appendix A-2. So, we can construct unique
demand vector q∗i for each undecided user i. Together with the
unique demand vectors of the decided users, we have found the
unique maximizing demand vector x∗ of SWO with support
sets {Jˆi}Ii=1.
Theorem 3: The social welfare optimization problem SWO
has a unique maximizing solution q∗ with probability 1.
Proof: The detailed proof is in Appendix A-3, here
we provide an outline. Assume there exist two maximizing
demand vectors of SWO which, by Lemma 2, have different
supports sets. The support set of a non-trivial convex combi-
nation of any two non-negative vectors is the union of support
sets of these two vectors. Hence, all convex combinations
of two maximizing demand vectors of SWO, which are also
maximizing demand vectors, have the same support. This is a
contradiction to Lemma 2.
Given an optimal demand vector q∗ of the SWO problem,
there exists a unique corresponding Lagrangue multiplier vec-
tor p∗, associated with the resource constraints of J providers
[7]. Next, we show that (q∗,p∗) is the unique equilibrium of
the provider competition game defined in Section II.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TWO-STAGE GAME
In this section we show that there exists a unique equi-
librium (defined more precisely shortly) of the multi-leader-
follower provider competition game. In particular, this equi-
librium corresponds to the unique social optimal solution of
SWO and the associated Lagrange multipliers. The idea is to
interpret the Lagrange multipliers as the prices announced by
the providers. Moreover, we show that there are at most J−1
undecided users at this equilibrium.
First, we define the equilibrium concept [8]:
Definition 3: (Subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)) A price
demand tuple (p∗, q∗(p∗)) is a subgame perfect equilibrium
for the provider competition game if no player has an incentive
to deviate unilaterally at any stage of the game. In particular,
each user i ∈ I maximizes its payoff given prices p∗.
Each provider j ∈ J maximizes its revenue given other
providers’ prices p∗−j = (p
∗
1, · · · , p∗j−1, p∗j+1, · · · p∗J) and the
users’ demand q∗(p∗).
We will compute the equilibrium concept using backward
induction. In Stage II, we will compute the best response of the
users q∗(p) as a function of any given price vector p. Then
in Stage I, we will compute the equilibrium prices p∗. For
equilibrium prices p∗, the best response of the users q∗(p∗)
is uniquely determined via BGR decoding.
A. Equilibrium strategy of the users in Stage II
Consider users facing prices p in the second stage. Each
user solves a user payoff maximization (UPM) problem:
UPM : max
qi≥0
vi = max
qi≥0
ui
 J∑
j=1
qijcij
− J∑
j=1
pjqij (6)
Lemma 4: For each user i ∈ I, there exists a unique
nonnegative value x∗i , such that
∑
j=1 cijqij = x
∗
i for every
maximizer qi of the UPM problem. Furthermore, for any j
such that qij > 0,
pj
cij
= mink∈J pkcik .
Proof is given in Appendix B-1. We remark that, together,
the unique x∗i ’s from Lemma 4 form a vector x
∗, which is
equal to x∗, the SWO maximizer from Lemma 1.
Definition 4: (Preference set) For any price vector p, user
i’s preference set Ji(p) includes each provider j ∈ J with
pj
cij
= mink∈J pkcik .
In light of Lemma 4, Ji is the set of providers from which
user i might request a strictly positive amount of resource.
Users can again be partitioned to decided and undecided based
on the cardinality of their preference sets, analogous to the
distinction made in Section III. The preference set of a decided
user i contains a singleton, and there is a unique vector qi
that maximizes his payoff. By contrast, the preference set of
an undecided user i contains more than one provider, and any
choice of qi ≥ 0 such that x∗i =
∑
j∈Ji qijcij maximizes his
payoff.
There is a close relationship between the support sets from
Section III and preference sets defined here. Facing prices p, a
user i may request positive resource only from providers who
are in his preference set Ji. By definition, he actually requests
positive resource from providers who are in his support set Jˆi.
So the support set of a user is a subset of his preference set:
Jˆi(q(p)) ⊂ Ji(p). We can construct a BGR based on the
preference sets and show that this BGR also has no loops
with probability 1, following a similar proof (Appendix A-1).
Suppose that the optimal Lagrange multipliers p∗ from
Section III are announced as prices. Since all users have
access to complete network information, each of them can
calculate all users’ preference sets, and can construct the
5corresponding BGR. Undecided users can now uniquely deter-
mine their demand vector by independently running the same
BGR decoding algorithm. The demand found through BGR
decoding is unique as all demand vectors are considered at
one time and equality of supply and demand is taken into
account. We note that the demand found in this way is only
one of an undecided user’s infinitely many best responses
under prices p∗. However, only the demands given by the BGR
decoding algorithm will balance the supply and demand for
each provider at the optimal price p∗. We will later show that
this is the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the provider
competition game.
B. Equilibrium strategy of the providers in Stage I
The optimal choice of prices for the providers depends on
how the users’ demand changes with respect to the price,
which further depends on the users’ utility functions. The
quantity that indicates how a user’s demand changes with
respect to the price is the coefficient of relative risk aversion
[9] of utility function ui, i.e. kiRRA = −xu
′′
i (x)
u′i(x)
. We focus on
a class of utility functions characterized in Assumption 4.
Assumption 4: For each user i ∈ I, the coefficient of
relative risk aversion of its utility function is less than 1.
Assumption 4 is satisfied by some commonly used utility
functions, such as log(1 + x) and the α−fair utility functions
x1−α
1−α , for α ∈ (0, 1) [10]. Under Assumption 4, a monopolistic
provider will sell all of its resource Qj to maximize its
revenue. Intuitively, when a provider lowers its price, the
demand of the users increases significantly enough that the
change in revenue of the provider is positive. This encourages
the provider to lower the price further such that eventually total
demand equals total supply. In the case of multiple providers,
Assumption 4 also ensures that all providers are willing to sell
all their resources to maximize their revenues.
We call the prices that achieve equality of demand and
supply market clearing prices.
Theorem 5: Under Assumption 4, the unique socially opti-
mal demand vector q∗ and the associated Lagrangian multi-
plier vector p∗ of the SWO problem constitute the unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the provider competition game.
The proof is given in Appendix B-2. It is interesting to
see that the competition of providers does not reduce social
efficiency. This is not a simple consequence of the strict
concavity of the users’ utility functions; it is also related to
the elasticity of users’ demands. Assumption 4 ensures that
the demands are elastic enough such that a small decrease in
price leads to significant increase in demand and thus a net
increase in revenue.
Under the optimal prices p∗ announced by the providers in
the first stage, the users in the second stage will determine
the unique demand vector q∗ using BGR decoding. On the
other hand, if the providers charge prices other than p∗, no
best-response from the users will make the demand equals to
the supply, which is a necessary condition for an equilibrium.
In light of Theorem 5, we will refer to the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium (p∗, q∗) of the provider competition game
as the equlibrium.
C. The number of undecided users
Since the presence of undecided users makes the analysis
challenging, it is interesting to understand how many unde-
cided users there can be in a given game. It turns out that
such number is upperbounded by the number of providers J
in the network.
Lemma 6: Under any given price vector p in the first stage,
the number of undecided users in the second stage is strictly
less than J .
The proof is given in Appendix B-3. The main idea is that
if the number of undecided user nodes in a BGR is not smaller
than the number of provider nodes, then there exists a loop
in the BGR. This, however, occurs with zero probability, as
shown in Section III.
V. PRIMAL-DUAL ALGORITHM
The previous analysis of the subgame perfect equilibrium
has assumed that every player (provider or user) knows the
complete information of the system. This may not be true
in practice. In this section we present a distributed primal-
dual algorithm where providers and users only know local
information and make local decisions in an iterative fashion.
We show that such algorithm globally converges to the unique
equilibrium discussed in Theorem 5 under mild conditions on
the updating rates.
The key proof idea is to show that the primal-dual algorithm
converges to a set containing the optimal solution of SWO. We
can further show that this set contains only the unique optimal
solution in most cases, regardless of the values of the updating
rates.
We first present the algorithm, and then the proof of its
convergence.
A. Primal-dual algorithm
In this section we will consider a continuous-time algorithm,
where all the variables are functions of time. For compactness
of exposition, we will sometimes write qij and pj when we
mean qij(t) and pj(t), respectively. Their time derivatives
∂qij
∂t
and ∂pj∂t will often be denoted by q˙ij and p˙j . We denote by q
∗
and p∗ the unique maximizer of SWO and the corresponding
Lagrange multiplier vector, respectively. As shown in Theorem
5, (p∗, q∗) is also the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of
the provider competition game. These values are constant.
To simplify the notation, we denote by fij(t) or simply
fij the marginal utility of user i with respect to qij when his
demand vector is qi(t):
fij =
∂ui(qi)
∂qij
= cij
∂ui(x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xi=
∑J
j=1 qijcij
. (7)
We will use f∗ij to denote the value of fij(t) evaluated at q
∗
i ,
the maximizing demand vector of user i. So, f∗ij is a constant
that is equal to a user’s equilibrium marginal utility as opposed
to fij(t) which indicates marginal utility at a particular time
t. We also define ∇ui(qi) = [fi1 · · · fiJ ]T and ∇ui(q∗i ) =
[f∗i1 · · · f∗iJ ]T , where all the vectors are column vectors.
6We define (x)+ = max(0, x) and
(x)+y =
{
x y > 0
(x)+ y ≤ 0.
Another way to think of this notation is (x)+y = x(1 −
1(−∞,0](x)1(−∞,0](y)), where 1 is the indicator function, i.e.,
1A(x) = 1 if x ∈ A, and 0 otherwise.
Motivated by the work in [11], we consider the following
standard primal-dual variable update algorithm:
q˙ij = k
q
ij (fij − pj)+qij , i ∈ I, j ∈ J (8)
p˙j = k
p
j
(
I∑
i=1
qij −Qj
)+
pj
, j ∈ J . (9)
Here kpij , k
p
j are the constants representing update rates. The
update rule ensures that, when a variables of interest (qij or
pj) is already zero, it will not become negative even when
the direction of the update (i.e. quantity in the parenthesis)
is negative. The tuple (q(t),p(t)) controlled by equations (8)
and (9) will be referred to as the solution trajectory of the
differential equations system defined by (8) and (9).
The motivation for the proposed algorithm is quite natural.
A provider increases its price when the demand is higher than
its supply and decreases its price when the demand is lower.
A user decreases his demand when a price is higher than
his marginal utility and increases it when a price is lower.
In essence, the algorithm is following the natural direction of
market forces.
One key observation is that these updates can be imple-
mented in a distributed fashion. The users only need to know
the prices proposed by the providers. The providers only need
to know the demand of the users for their own resource, and
not for the resource of other providers (as was the case in
the analysis of Section IV). In particular, only user i needs to
know his own channel offset parameters cij , j ∈ J .
The first step to prove the algorithm’s convergence is to
construct a lower-bounded La Selle function V (q(t),p(t))
and show that its value is non-increasing for any solution
trajectory (q(t),p(t)) that satisfies (8) and (9). This will
ensure that (q(t),p(t)) converge to a set of values that keeps
V (q(t),p(t)) constant.
B. Convergence of the primal-dual to an invariant set
We consider the following La Salle function:
V (q(t),p(t)) = V (t)
=
∑
i,j
1
kqij
∫ qij(t)
0
(β − q∗ij)dβ +
∑
j
1
kpj
∫ pj(t)
0
(β − p∗j )dβ,
It can be shown that V (q(t),p(t)) ≥ V (q∗,p∗), i.e., V
is bounded from below. This ensures that if the function V is
non-increasing, it will eventually reach a constant value (which
may or may not be the global minimum V (q∗,p∗)).
The derivative of V along the solution trajectories of the
system, ∂V∂t , denoted by V˙ , is given by:
V˙ (t) =
∑
i,j
∂V
∂qij
q˙ij +
∑
j
∂V
∂pj
p˙j .
Lemma 7: The value of the La Selle function V is non-
increasing along the solution trajectory, defined by (8) and
(9), i.e. V˙ (t) ≤ 0.
Proof: Proof is given in Appendix C-1. The proof manip-
ulates the expression for V˙ and shows that it can be reduced
to the following form:
V˙ ≤
∑
i
∑
j
(qij(t)− q∗ij)(fij(t)− f∗ij)

+
∑
i,j
(qij(t)− q∗ij)(f∗ij − p∗j ). (10)
Using concavity of u′is and properties of the equilibrium
point q∗,p∗, we can show that individual elements of the
summations in (10) are non-positive.
Combining Lemma 7 and the La Salle’s invariance principle
(Theorem 4.4 of [12], p. 128) we can prove the following:
Proposition 8: The pair q(t),p(t) converges to the invari-
ant set VL = {q(t),p(t) : V˙ (q(t),p(t)) = 0} as t → ∞.
It is clear that the invariant set VL contains the solution
trajectory that has the value of the unique maximizer of SWO
(q∗(t),p∗(t)) = (q∗,p∗) for all t, since V˙ (q∗,p∗) = 0.
However it may contain other points as well. When the
trajectory (q(t),p(t)) enters the invariant set, it either reaches
its minimum (i.e., by converging to the unique equilibrium
point (q∗,p∗)), or it gets stuck permanently in some limit
cycle. In either case, the trajectory will be confined to a subset
of VL = {(q(t),p(t)) : V˙ (q(t),p(t)) = 0}.
The remainder of this section is to show that the invariant
set VL contains only the equilibrium point (q∗,p∗). This will
be done in two steps. First, we show that the set VL has only
one element for the majority of provider competition instances,
without any restrictions on the variable update rates. Second,
we provide a sufficient condition on the update rates so that
the global convergences to the unique equilibrium point is also
guaranteed in the remaining instances.
C. Convergence when providers have decided customers
In the following two sections we consider the properties of
the solution trajectory on the invariant set VL.
The proof of Lemma 7 shows that individual terms on
the right-hand side of (10) are non-positive. Combined with
Proposition 8, we get the following result:
Corollary 9: On the invariant set VL, q(t),p(t) are such
that:∑
j
(qij(t)− q∗ij)(fij(t)− f∗ij)
=(∇ui(qi)(t)−∇ui(q∗i ))T (qi(t)− q∗i ) = 0,∀i ∈ I (11)
(qij(t)− q∗ij)(f∗ij − p∗j ) = 0, for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J , (12)
7where we recall that ∇ui(qi)(t) = [fi1 · · · fiJ ]T and
∇ui(q∗i ) = [f∗i1 · · · f∗iJ ]T .
Expressions (11) and (12) give basic properties of the solu-
tion trajectories q(t),p(t) on the invariant set. We next prove
two intermediate results that give further characterization of
q(t),p(t) on VL.
Lemma 10: For any point in the invariant set VL, we have
fij(t) = f
∗
ij for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J . In other words, any user i’s
marginal utility with respect to its demand of any provider j
equals to the corresponding value at the unique equilibrium.
In addition, qij(t)(f∗ij − p∗j ) = 0 on the invariant set VL.
The proof is given in Appendix C-2. An equivalent way of
stating the first part of Lemma 10 is that xi(t) = x∗i on VL:∑
j
qij(t)cij =
∑
j
q∗ijcij , for all i ∈ I. (13)
The second part of Lemma 10 claims that qij(t)(f∗ij−p∗j ) = 0.
From the proof of Lemma 4, we know q∗ij(f
∗
ij − p∗j ) = 0. So
for i, j such that f∗ij < p
∗
j , q
∗
ij = 0 implies that qij(t) = 0.
This is good news, since from Lemma 6 most users have zero
demand to all but one provider at the unique equilibrium. Now
we know that the same holds on the invariant set VL. Similarly,
qij(t) > 0 only if f∗ij = p
∗
j .
Lemma 10 does not preclude the possibility that a demand
qij(t) for a user with f∗ij = p
∗
j may oscillate between being
zero and being strictly positive. The following Lemma shows
that this is not possible:
Lemma 11: The set Jˆi(t) = {j ∈ J : qij(t) > 0} does not
change over time on the invariant set. In addition, pj(t) > 0
on the invariant set for all j ∈ J .
The proof is given in Appendix C-3. Lemma 11 implies that
if qij(t) = 0 on the invariant set VL, then q˙ij(t) = 0 on VL.
Also, if qij(t) > 0 then q˙ij(t) = k
q
ij
(
f∗ij − pj
)
, as strictly
positive demand stays strictly positive on the invariant set.
We are now ready to claim the main result of this subsection:
Theorem 12: A demand vector of a decided user i ∈ I con-
verges to the equilibrium demand vector, i.e. limt→∞ qi(t) =
q∗i . The price pj of any provider j who has at least one decided
user at the equilibrium (q∗,p∗), converges to the equilibrium
price, i.e. limt→∞ pj(t) = p∗j .
Proof: Consider an arbitrary user i who at the equilibrium
has only one preferred provider ¯, i.e., f∗i¯ = p
∗
¯ for ¯ such that
q∗i¯ > 0, and f
∗
ij < p
∗
j for j 6= ¯. By Lemma 10, this implies
qi¯(t) > 0, qij(t) = 0 and q˙ij(t) = 0 for all j 6= ¯. Combined
with (13), this means that qi¯(t) = q∗i¯ and q˙i¯(t) = 0, i.e.,
user i’s demand vector converges to its equilibrium value. For
provider ¯, qi¯ > 0 so by Lemma 11:
0 =q˙i¯(t) = k
q
i¯
(
f∗i¯ − p¯(t)
)+
qi¯
= kqi¯
(
f∗i¯ − p¯(t)
)
.
From this it follows that p¯(t) = f∗i¯ = p
∗
¯ . Further
differentiation yields p˙¯(t) = 0, meaning that the prices have
also converged, which completes the proof.
Theorem 13: If every provider has at least one decided
customer in the unique equilibrium of the provider competition
game, the primal dual algorithm converges to this equilibrium.
Proof: By Theorem 12, the prices of all providers and
the demand vectors of all decided users converge on the
invariant set. It remains to be shown that the demand vectors
of undecided users also converge. By an argument similar to
the proof of Lemma 2, we can draw a BGR for the undecided
users. The demand vectors of undecided users that satisfy the
constraints on the BGR are unique, and thus also converge.
In most practical cases, where the number of users is
much larger than the number of providers, all providers will
have at least one decided user, and hence the convergence
of the primal-dual algorithm is guaranteed. Next we study
the more complicated case where some providers do not
have any associated decided users. In that case, we can still
prove the convergence of the primal-dual algorithm under mild
conditions of the variable update rates.
D. Convergence when providers have no decided customers
Without loss of generality, we now focus on the problem
where all the users are undecided at the equilibrium. If we
can prove that the algorithm converges in this case, then we
can also prove convergence in the more general case where
some providers have decided users. Let I be the number of
undecided users, and J the number of providers. From Lemma
6 we know that I < J .
Theorem 14: Let I < J , and suppose that at the equilibrium
|{j ∈ J : q∗ij > 0}| > 1 for all i ∈ I. The primal-dual
algorithm converges to the unique equilibrium if the price
update rates kpj are not integer multiples of each other and the
demand update rates are equal, i.e. kqij = k ∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J .
Proof: We first define some matrices to facilitate the
proof. Let C be the I × IJ matrix of channel offsets cij . Let
IJ be the identity matrix of size J ×J . Define matrix A to be
the IJ×J matrix of I vertically stacked identity matrices. Let
Kp = diag(kpj , j ∈ J ) be a J×J diagonal matrix containing
price update rates. Let the IJ×IJ diagonal matrix Kq be the
matrix of demand update rates whose yth entry is Kqy,y = k
q
i,j ,
where i = b(y − 1)/Jc + 1 and j = ((y − 1) mod J) + 1,
and the off-diagonal entries are all zeros. Here bxc is the floor
function representing the largest integer not larger than x.
By (13), we know that the effective resource of all users
has converged on the invariant set VL. We rewrite this as
cTi (t)qi = c
T
i q
∗
i for all i ∈ I, or Cq(t) = Cq∗.
We want to express the primal-dual update algorithm (8)
and (9) in matrix form. The final hurdle is getting rid of the
(x)+y operation. From Lemma 11 we know that p(t) > 0 and
that the support sets of vectors q(t) do not change on the
invariant set. Hence, we can write q˙ij = k
q
ij (fij − pj)+qij =
kqij
(
f∗ij − pj
)
1(0,∞)(qij) (recall that fij = f∗ij on the invari-
ant set). This enables us to revise the definition of the update
rates matrix to be Kˆq = diag(kqij1(0,∞)(qij), i ∈ I, j ∈ J ).
Then, (8) and (9) can be written as:
q˙ =Kˆq (f∗ −Ap(t)) (14)
p˙ =Kp
(
ATq(t)−Q) . (15)
Notice that (14) and (15) form a system of linear equations,
so the non-linear primal dual dynamics defined in (8) and (9)
becomes linear on the invariant set. The following result paves
the way to showing that p(t) is constant on VL.
8Lemma 15: Let E and B be constant matrices, where B =[
B;BD; · · · ;BDJ−1] (B is a tall matrix), B = CKˆqA, and
D = KpAT KˆqA. The dimensions of B, B and D are IJ×J ,
I×J and J×J , respectively. On the invariant set, Bp(t) = E.
Proof: The proof is obtained by repeatedly differentiating
Equations (14) and (15) with respect to time. The more
detailed calculation is given in Appendix C-4.
If we can prove that the rank of B is J , then we could write
BJp(t) = E, where BJ is a J×J matrix constructed by taking
J linearly independent rows of B. Then p(t) = EB−1J , which
implies that p(t) converges on the invariant set. To show that
the rank of matrix B is J , we use Theorem 6.01 from [13]
(its proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.1 in [13]):
Theorem 16: A matrix B = [B;BD; · · · ;BDJ−1] has full
column rank if and only if matrix G =
[
B
D − λjI
]
has full
column rank for all eigenvalues λj , j ∈ J of D.
We now provide a sufficient condition to ensure convergence
of the primal-dual algorithm.
Lemma 17: Let matrices B and D be defined as in Lemma
15. Matrix G =
[
B
D − λI
]
has full column rank for all
eigenvalues λ of D if kpj 6= akpj′ ∀j, j′ ∈ J and all a ∈ N+
(i.e., as long as the price update rates are not integer multiples
of each other) and kqij = k, for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J .
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C-5.
Combining Lemma 16 and Lemma 17, we see that a unique
vector p(t) can be computed from equation Bp(t) = E,
meaning that p(t) takes a single value on the invariant set and
does not change with time. This also means that the demand
vector q(t) does not change on the invariant set. So since
p˙ = 0 and q˙ = 0, the primal dual algorithm converges to
an equilibrium point, which we call a dynamic equilibrium
point. It can be shown that the dynamic equilibrium point
is constrained by the same set of equations as the unique
equilibrium of the provider competition game (refer to the
proof of Theorem 5). Hence, there is only one element in the
invariant set VL, and it corresponds to the equilibrium of the
provider competition game, (q∗,p∗). This concludes the proof
of Theorem 14.
Note that that the condition on the update rates in Theorem
14 is sufficient but not necessary. In fact, by looking at the
form of the D matrix from the proof of Lemma 17, we can
see that a sufficient condition on the price update rates is that
kpj (
∑
i∈Ij kij), where Ij = {i ∈ I : qij > 0}, has a different
value for each j ∈ J . This condition can be satisfied with
probability 1, e.g. by drawing kpj ’s and k
q
ij’s independently
from some continuous distribution.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For numerical results, we extend the setup from Example 1,
where the resource being sold is the fraction of time allocated
to exclusive use of the providers’ frequency band, i.e., Qj = 1
for j ∈ J . We take the bandwidth of the providers to be
Wj = 20MHz, j ∈ J . User i’s utility function is ai log(1 +∑J
j=1 qijcij), where we compute the spectral efficiency cij
from the Shannon formula 12W log(1+
Eb/N0
W |hij |2), qij is the
allocated time fraction, Eb/N0 is the ratio of transmit power to
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Fig. 2: Example of equilibrium user-provider association
thermal noise, and ai is the individual willingness to pay factor
taken to be the same across users. The channel gain amplitudes
|hij | = ξij
d
α/2
ij
follow Rayleigh fading, where ξij is a Rayleigh
distributed random variable with parameter 1, and α = 3 is
the outdoor power distance loss. We choose the parameters so
that the cij of a user is on average around 3.5Mbps when the
distance is 50m, and around 60Mbps when the distance is 5m.
The average signal-to-noise ratio Eb/(N0dα) at 5m is around
25dB. We assume perfect modulation and coding choices
such that the communication rates come from a continuum of
values. The users are uniformly placed in a 200m by 200m
area. We want to emphasize that the above parameters are
chosen for illustrative purposes only. Our theory applies to
any number of providers, any number of users, any type of
channel attenuation models, and arbitrary network topologies.
We first consider a single instantiation with 20 users and 5
providers. In Fig. 2, we show the user-provider association
at the equilibrium for a particular realization of channel
gains, where the thickness of the link indicates the amount
of resource purchased. The users are labeled by numbers (1-
20), and the providers are labeled by letters (a-e). This figure
shows two undecided users (12 and 16), and that certain users
(1,7,13, and 8) do not purchase any resource at equilibrium.
For the same realization of channel parameters, Fig. 3 shows
the channel quality, user demand, and rate at the equilibrium,
for users 5, 10, 12, 15, and 18. We see that user 15 has
better channel with provider d than with provider a, but in
the equilibrium all of his demand is towards provider a. This
can be explained by looking at the bottom part of Fig. 4,
where the dashed lines indicate equilibrium prices. We see
that the provider a announces a smaller price than provider d.
The equilibrium prices reflect the competition among users: in
Fig. 2 we see that provider b has the most customers, so it is
not surprising that its price is the highest, as seen in Fig. 4.
We next consider the convergence time of the discrete time
version of the primal-dual algorithm. We fix the number of
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Fig. 3: Channel quality offset, demand and effective
resource at equilibrium
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providers to be 5, and change the number of users from 20
to 100. For each parameter, we run 200 experiments with
randomly generated user and provider locations and plot the
average speed of convergence. The convergence is defined as
the number of iterations after which the difference between
supply and demand is no larger than Qj . Fig. 5 shows
the average convergence time for different values of . In
general, 200 to 400 iterations are needed for convergence with
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Fig. 6: Average time to convergence for different
numbers of providers
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Fig. 7: Average time to convergence with standard deviation
 = 10−2, and 100-200 more iterations to get to 10−3. In
Fig. 6, we compare the average convergence time for different
number of providers. Here we take the stopping criterion to
be  = 10−3. The convergence time depends on the update
rates used for the primal-dual: if the update rates are too high,
then the variables will tend to oscillate, so the algorithm will
take too long to converge. On the other hand, if the rates are
too small, the variables may converge too slowly. According
to our theoretical analysis from Section V, we randomly
assigned update variables to ensure global convergence of the
algorithm. In general a very small or very large number of
users per provider means that the algorithm will take longer
to converge. Finally, Fig. 7 shows the average convergence
time for 5 providers with the standard deviation. The variance
of convergence time does not change with the number of users,
except for the case of 20 users. Empirically, the algorithm is
sensitive to the choice of update rates when the ratio of users
per provider is smaller than 4. In such cases the prices and
demands may oscillate and take a long time to converge, which
can also be seen in Fig. 6.
A. Discussion
We first comment on the implication of having undecided
users at equilibrium. Given a set of prices, the decided users
can calculate the unique demand vector that maximizes their
payoffs, while the undecided users have an infinite number
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of such vectors. In particular, calculating the equilibrium
maximizing demand vectors for undecided users may require
cooperation between different providers, which may be chal-
lenging in practice.
On the other hand, the number of undecided users is small,
i.e., not larger than J , and it does not grow with the number
of users. Future systems may have user action replaced by
the actions of software agents in charge of connection and
handover between different providers. In this case, splitting
over different providers may become feasible. This is similar
to soft handoff (soft handover), a feature used by CDMA and
WCDMA standards [14]. In addition, when the number of
users is large, the impact of a single user on the price may
be small. Hence, operating at a non-equilibrium price as the
result of the decisions of a few undecided users may not have
a great impact on the experienced quality of service, although
the exact loss remains to be quantified.
In the model we consider, we observe the “locally monop-
olistic” nature of wireless commerce, which does not exist for
most other traditional goods. Namely, a user that has a strong
channel to some provider, but a weak one to others, is willing
to pay a higher price to the provider with the strong channel,
and is thus not influenced by moderate price changes during
the price competition. On the other hand, users with similar
channel gains to all providers will be more sensitive to price
competition. This local monopoly is in contrast to some other
wireless resource allocation models where users’ association
is based solely on the price, in which case all users go to the
provider with the cheapest price (see, e.g. [15]).
VII. RELATED WORK
In this paper we have considered a linear-usage pricing
scheme, which has been widely adopted in the literature (see
e.g. [4], [16]). Analyzing such pricing yields various insights:
for example the existing TCP protocol can be interpreted as
a usage-based pricing scheme that solves a network utility
maximization problem [4]. In practice, however, providers
charge monthly subscription fees. For both voice and data
plans, these subscriptions are sometimes combined with linear
pricing beyond a predefined usage threshold. Pure linear pric-
ing based on instantaneous channel conditions is generally not
used, although it has received renewed attention due to near-
saturation of some mobile networks (see, e.g. [17]). Recently,
AT&T introduced hybrid price plans, consisting of a flat rate
fee for a certain amount of data, and linear pricing beyond
that limit [18].
There exists a rich body of related literature on using
pricing and game theory to study provider resource allocation
and interactions of service providers. The related research in
the wireless setting can be divided into several categories:
optimization-based resource allocation of one provider (e.g.,
[19]–[24]), game theoretic study of interactions between the
users of one provider (e.g., [25]–[28]), competition of different
service providers on behalf of the users (e.g., [29], [30]), and
providers’ price competition to attract users (e.g., [31]–[39]).
Our current work falls into the last category.
In our work, we have simultaneously considered several
factors that reflect diverse wireless network scenarios: an
arbitrary number of wireless providers compete for an arbitrary
number of atomic users, where the users are heterogenous both
in channels gains and in willingness to pay. In related work
where providers price-compete to attract users [31], [33], [34],
purchasing a unit of resource from different providers brings
the same amount of utility to a user; in our work a user’s
utility still depends on the channel gain to the provider. In
other work where the Wardrop equilibrium concept is used
(e.g., [15]), users are infinitesimal and non-heterogenous; in
our work users are atomic and have different willingness to
pay. One of the early work that explicitly takes into account
the channel differences for different users on a line is [36], for
infinitesimal users and distance-based channel gains. Recently,
a model similar to ours was used to treat a three-tier system
[35], although for specific utility functions. The multiple-
seller multiple-buyer dynamics in a cognitive radio setting was
studied in [37] using evolutionary game theory. Finally, [38]
and [39] consider price competition in a multi-hop wireless
network scenario.
The design and proof of the decentralized algorithm were
inspired by Chen et al. [11], with several key differences. First,
their work considers the optimal resource allocation of a single
OFDM cell. Second, it studies a system where each user has
a total power constraint. Third, there are often infinitely many
global optimal solutions in [11] and finally, our convergence
results are proved with a set of conditions that are less stringent
than those of [11].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We provide an overview of the relationship between differ-
ent concepts used throughout this work in Figure 8.
Social Welfare Optimization (SWO)
Section III, Assumptions 1-3
maximizing vector q∗
Lagrange multipliers p∗
(q∗,p∗)
Provider Competition Game
Section IV, Assumptions 1-4
equilibrium price p∗
equilibrium user demand q∗
(q∗,p∗)
Primal-Dual Algorithm, Section V
limt→∞(q(t),p(t)) = (q∗,p∗)
(q∗,p∗)
Fig. 8: Relationship between different concepts
We have studied the competition of an arbitrary number
of wireless service providers, who want to serve a group of
atomic users who are heterogenous in both willingness to pay
and channel quality. We have modeled this interaction as a
two-stage wireless provider game, and have characterized its
unique equilibrium. We have shown that the provider compe-
tition leads to a unique socially optimal resource allocation
for a broad class of utility functions and a generic channel
model. Our results show that some users need to purchase their
resource from several providers at the equilibrium, although
the number of such users is upper bounded by the number of
providers. We have also developed a decentralized algorithm
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which converges to the equilibrium prices as well as the
equilibrium demand vectors using only local knowledge.
Further work may include the study of fractional equilibria
with the goal of characterizing the losses that occur when
undecided users are unable to split their resource demand in an
optimal way. It is also interesting to consider communication
models where users cause externalities such as interference to
each other.
APPENDIX A
SOCIAL OPTIMALITY PROOFS
1. Proof of BGR Property 3
We first examine the properties of the optimal demand
vector of the SWO problem. We will express the SWO in
terms of the demand vector q only, by substituting directly
equation (3) into equation (2). Let p = [p1 · · · pJ ] be the vector
of Lagrangian multipliers. The Lagrangian for SWO is then
L(q,p) =
I∑
i=1
ui
 J∑
j=1
qijcij
+ J∑
j=1
pj
(
Qj −
I∑
i=1
qij
)
.
(16)
It is easy to check that the SWO problem satisfies the Slater’s
condition [40], and thus the sufficient and necessary KKT
conditions for an optimal solution (q,p) are as follows:
∂ui(xi)
∂xi
cij − pj ≤0, j ∈ J ; i ∈ I (17)
qij
(
∂ui(xi)
∂xi
cij − pj
)
=0, j ∈ J ; i ∈ I (18)
J∑
j=1
qijcij =xi, i ∈ I (19)
I∑
i=1
qij =Qj , j ∈ J (20)
pj > 0, qij ≥0 j ∈ J ; i ∈ I (21)
where with some abuse of notation we use ∂ui(xi)∂xi to denote
∂ui(x)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=xi=
∑J
j=1 qijcij
.
The following characterizes the relationship between the
prices of any two networks from which a user has strictly
positive demand.
Recall the support set definition Jˆi(qi) = {j ∈ J : qij >
0}. From (17) we see that ∂ui(xi)∂xi ≤ mink∈J
pk
cik
. Then, from
(18) we can see that qij > 0 only when
∂ui(xi)
∂xi
=
pj
cij
. Hence
pj
cij
= mink∈J pkcik is a necessary condition for qij > 0 for all
i ∈ I, j ∈ J . Then, qij > 0 and qij′ > 0 implies pjcij =
pj′
cij′
=
mink∈J pkcik . In particular, qij > 0 and qij′ > 0 implies
cij
cij′
=
pj
pj′
. (22)
We now consider the BGR defined by the support sets
{Jˆi}Ii=1 of undecided users. For any two edges (i, j) and (i, k)
of BGR, where i is the user index and j, k are the provider
indices, qij > 0 and qik > 0 so by (22) we have
cij
cik
=
pj
pk
.
Suppose that a loop exists in BGR (refer to Fig. 9 for this
part of the proof). Then, a sequence of nodes i1, j1, i2, j2, . . . ,
in, jn, i1 exists, where i1, . . . , in are the user nodes and
j1, . . . , jn are the provider nodes, such that (ik, jk) and
(jk−1, ik) are edges in BGR for k = 1, . . . n (with i0 defined
as in). We assume that the members of the sequence are
distinct otherwise there is already a smaller loop inside. Since
both (ik, jk) and (jk−1, ik) are edges, then
cik−1
cik
= pk−1pk ,
based on (22). A loop in the BGR implies:
ci1n
ci11
ci21
ci22
. . .
cin−1n−2
cin−1n−1
cinn−1
cinn
=
pn
p1
p1
p2
. . .
pn−2
pn−1
pn−1
pn
= 1.
i1 i2 i3 in
j1 j2 j3 jn−1 jn
· · ·
Fig. 9: A bipartite graph representation loop
Since ci1nci11
ci21
ci22
. . .
cin−1n−2
cin−1n−1
cinn−1
cinn
is a function of indepen-
dent continuous random variables, it is also a continuous
random variable itself. The probability that the product of
independent continuous random variables equals a constant
is zero, so we can conclude that a BGR has loops with
probability zero. In other words, a BGR has no loop with
probability one.
2. BGR Algorithm
Let E be the set of edges, and Iˆ and Jˆ be the set of all
user and provider nodes, respectively, present in the BGR. The
demand of undecided users can be found using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 BGR decoding
1: For each undecided node i ∈ Iˆ, calculate the checksum
Pi ← x∗i
2: For each provider j ∈ Jˆ calculate the checksum Sj ←
Qj −
∑
i:(i,j)/∈G q
∗
ij , ∀j ∈ Jˆ
3: For each q∗ij > 0, add edge (i,j) to the edge set E
4: while E 6= ∅ do
5: find a leaf node l and associated edge (i, j)
6: if the leaf node is a user node then
7: q∗ij ← Picij
8: else
9: q∗ij ← Si
10: end if
11: Pi ←
(
Pi − q∗ijcij
)
and Sj ←
(
Sj − q∗ij
)
12: remove edge (i, j)
13: end while
We now give an informal description of an algorithm that
finds the optimal and unique values of q∗i for undecided users.
Since BGR has no loops, it is a (unrooted) tree. Hence, we
can run a simple iterative algorithm which removes a leaf node
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(node with a single incoming edge) and its associated edge at
each iteration. We begin by finding a leaf node in the BGR.
We then determine the demand of the edge associated to the
leaf node either from BGR Property 1) or 2). Using this value
we update the check-sum value of its parent node. Then we
remove the leaf node and the associated edge. This completes
one iteration. We repeat the process until there are no more
edges in the graph.
The key for Algorithm 1 to work is that the BGR has no
loops, so a leaf node can always be found in line 5. Notice
that in the last iteration, there will be only one user node i
and one provider node j left connected by an edge with value
q∗ij . The checksums for these two nodes are Pi and Sj , which
satisfy Pi = Sjcij since Pi = q∗ijcij and Sj = q
∗
ij . Upon
completion of the algorithm, the demand of undecided users
is uniquely defined.
3. Proof of Theorem 3
Assume there exist two optimal demand vectors of SWO
q∗ and q′. By Lemma 2, q∗ and q′ have different support
sets {Jˆ ∗i }Ii=1 and {Jˆ ′i }Ii=1 almost surely. Next, consider a
convex combination demand vector qλ = λq∗ + λ¯q′ where
λ ∈ (0, 1), λ¯ = 1−λ. Since x∗i =
∑J
j=1 q
∗
ijcij =
∑J
j=1 q
′
ijcij ,
then
∑J
j=1 q
λ
ijcij = λ
∑J
j=1 q
∗
ijcij + λ¯
∑J
j=1 q
′
ijcij = x
∗
i , so
it follows that qλ is also a maximizing solution of SWO for
any λ ∈ (0, 1). Then, the support set Jˆ λi (qλ) = {j ∈ J :
qλij = λq
∗
ij + λ¯q
′
ij > 0} for user i is Jˆ λi = Jˆ ∗i ∪ Jˆ ′i , for
all λ ∈ (0, 1). In particular, the support sets {Jˆ λi }Ii=1 are the
same for all λ ∈ (0, 1), which is a contradiction to Lemma 2.
APPENDIX B
PROVIDER COMPETITION GAME PROOFS
1. Proof of Lemma 4
It can be verified that UPM satisfies Slater’s conditions [40].
The necessary and sufficient KKT conditions for an optimal
solution qi ≥ 0 of UPM of user i are as follows:
u′i(xi)cij ≤pj , j ∈ J (23)
qij (u
′
i(xi)cij − pj) =0, j ∈ J (24)
where xi =
J∑
j=1
qijcij , qi ≥ 0 (25)
Expression (23) implies u′i(xi) ≤ α, where α = mink∈J pkcik .
Based on the utility function of user i, there are two cases:
u′i(0) < α and u
′
i(0) ≥ α.
In the first case u′i(0)cij − pj < 0, so u′i(xi)cij − pj < 0
for all xi ≥ 0 and for all j ∈ J . This is because the marginal
utility u′i(·) is a strictly decreasing function, by Assumption
1. Thus, by (24), qij = 0 for all j ∈ J . Therefore, qi = 0 and
by (25) x∗i = 0. So, (23)-(25) hold for a unique value x
∗
i = 0.
In the second case, u′i(0) ≥ α. Then, because u′i(·) de-
creases to zero (Assumption 1), there is a unique xˆi ≥ 0 such
that u′i(xˆi) = α. We first check that there is a qi such that
equations (23)-(25) hold with xi = xˆi. Equation (23) holds
because u′i(xˆi) = α ≤ pj/cij for all j ∈ J . Next, by (24),
for any j such that pj/cij > α = u′i(xˆi) we have qij = 0. For
any other j, pj/cij = α = u′i(xˆi), thus, with respect to (24),
qij can take any non-negative value. In particular, for the set
{j ∈ J : pj/cij = α} we can choose qij’s so that (25) holds.
Note that qij is positive only when pj/cij = α, which
proves the last part of the lemma. It remains to show that
xˆi is the only value of xi for which a qi satisfying (23)-
(25) exists. For any xi < xˆi, u′i(xi) > α so (23) is violated
for j ∈ argmin pk/cik. For any xi > xˆi, ui(xi) < α so
ui(xi)cij − pj < 0 for all j ∈ J . Then, (24) implies that
qij = 0 for all j ∈ J , meaning that xi = 0, which contradicts
xi > xˆi > 0. Therefore xˆi is the unique searched value x∗i .
2. Proof of Theorem 5
Assume that the providers charge prices p = [p1 . . . pJ ] to
the users. Then, each user faces a local maximization problem
UPMi(p), as defined in (6).
Equations (23) - (25), together with qi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I, are
equivalent to equations (17)-(19) and (21). Furthermore, under
assumption 4, for q to be an SPE of the provider competition
game, the demand to each provider must equal its supply, i.e.,∑I
i=1 qij = Qj for all j ∈ J (i.e., equations (20)). Hence, the
SPE is a price vector tuple (p, q) that satisfies KKT conditions
(17)-(21). But, the KKT conditions (17)-(21) are necessary and
sufficient for any vector tuple (p, q) to be the maximizing
solution of SWO. Hence, we have established formal equiva-
lence between the SPE of the provider competition game and
the maximizing demand vector and Lagrangian multipliers of
the SWO problem (q∗,p∗). Hence, (p∗, q∗) forms the unique
SPE of the provider competition game.
3. Proof of Lemma 6
Given an arbitrary price vector p, we can construct the
corresponding BGR(p) from the users’ preference sets. First
consider a BGR that is connected (single component). We start
drawing the graph with a single undecided user node, and then
add the provider nodes that are connected to this user node.
There should be at least two such provider nodes. Then we
add another undecided user node which shares one common
provider node with the existing undecided user node. This new
undecided user node will bring at least one new provider node
into the graph, otherwise it leads to a loop in the graph. We
repeat this process iteratively. Since the number of provider
nodes is upper-bounded by J , the total number of undecided
user nodes is upper-bounded by J − 1. The “−1” is due to
the fact that the first undecided user node is connected to (at
least) two new provider nodes in the graph. If we consider a
BGR with b disconnected subgraphs, it can be shown that the
total number of undecided users is bounded by J − b.
APPENDIX C
PRIMAL DUAL ALGORITHM SUPPORTING PROOFS
1. Proof of Lemma 7 — Proof that V˙ ≤ 0:
For the optimal demand vector q∗ of the SWO problem and
the associated Lagrange multipliers p∗, we see that f∗ij = p
∗
j
whenever q∗ij > 0 from equation (18), and f
∗
ij ≤ p∗j when
q∗ij = 0 from equations (17) and (18). Similarly, equation (18)
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ensures that f∗ij < p
∗
j implies q
∗
ij = 0. This fact will be used
shortly. For our La Salle function:
V˙ =
(a)
=
∑
i,j
(qij − q∗ij)(fij − pj)+qij +
∑
j
(pj − p∗j )(
∑
i
qij −Qj)+pj
(b)
≤
∑
i,j
(qij − q∗ij)(fij − pj) +
∑
j
(pj − p∗j )(
∑
i
qij −Qj)
(c)
=
∑
i
(
∑
j
(qij − q∗ij)(fij − f∗ij)) +
∑
i,j
(qij − q∗ij)(f∗ij − p∗j ),
where (a) follows from the definition of V and V˙ , (b) can be
readily verified by examining all the cases, and (c) is obtained
by some algebraic manipulation. The expression for V˙ is now
in such a form that we can prove V˙ ≤ 0.
First, the following is true for any two vectors q1 and q2
due to concavity (see, e.g. Section 3.1.3 of [40]):
∇uTi (q1)(q2 − q1) ≥ ui(q2)− ui(q1), (26)
∇uTi (q2)(q1 − q2) ≥ ui(q1)− ui(q2). (27)
Substituting q1 = qi(t) and q2 = q
∗
i in (26) and (27) gives:
∇uTi (qi)(q∗i − qi) ≥ ∇u∗i (qi)(q∗i − qi),
which can be rewritten as∑
j
(qij(t)− q∗ij)(fij(t)− f∗ij) ≤ 0, for all i ∈ I, (28)
which we recognize as one of the components of the first
term in (10). Considering a component of the second term in
(10), (qij(t) − q∗ij)(f∗ij − p∗j ), we first recall from the KKT
conditions (18) that either f∗ij = p
∗
j , in which case (qij −
q∗ij)(f
∗
ij − p∗j ) = 0, or f∗ij < p∗j , in which case q∗ij = 0 so
(qij − q∗ij)(f∗ij − p∗j ) ≤ 0. Hence,
(qij(t)− q∗ij)(f∗ij − p∗j ) ≤ 0, for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J . (29)
which completes the proof that V˙ ≤ 0.
2. Proof of Lemma 10 — Proof that marginal utility on VL is
the equilibrium marginal utility.
Recall that for user i, fij(qi) =
∂ui(xi)
∂xi
cij = u
′
i(xi)cij for
all j ∈ J , where xi(t) =
∑
j qij(t)cij and u
′
i(xi(t)) is a
scalar function of time. Hence,
∇uTi (qi) = u′i(xi)[ci1 · · · ciJ ] = u′i(xi)cTi .
We now consider equations (11), which can be rewritten as:
∇uTi (qi)(qi − q∗i ) =∇uTi (q∗i )(qi − q∗i ), or,
u′i(xi)c
T
i (qi − q∗i ) =u′i(x∗i )cTi (qi − q∗i ),
which leads to u′i(xi)∆xi(t) = u
′
i(x
∗
i )∆xi(t), where
∆xi(t) = c
T
i (qi(t) − q∗i ). Then, either ∆xi(t) = 0, or
u′i(xi(t)) = u
′
i(x
∗
i ). The necessary and sufficient condition for
both is that that xi(t) = x∗i , for qi(t), i ∈ I on the invariant
set VL. An immediate corollary is that fij(t) = f∗ij on VL for
all i ∈ I, j ∈ J .
The second part of the Lemma is simpler to prove. Equation
(12) gives qij(t)(f∗ij − p∗j ) = q∗ij(f∗ij − p∗j ), which is equal to
zero by equation (18). This concludes the proof.
3. Proof of Lemma 11 — Proof that the support set of primal
and dual variables does not change on the invariant set
We prove that the set of positive demands does not change
over time on the invariant set by contradiction. Suppose that
qij(t) > 0 but qij(t + τ) = 0 for all τ such that 0 < τ < ,
where  is a small number. Then q˙ij(t) < 0 but q˙ij(t+τ) = 0,
so we have
lim
τ→0
∑
j∈Ji
qij(t)cij − qij(t+ τ)cij < 0
On the other hand differentiating equation (13) with respect to
time yields
∑
j∈Ji qij(t)cij = 0 and
∑
j∈Ji qij(t+τ)cij = 0,
which is a contradiction. So a non-zero qij stays non-zero.
Suppose now that qij(t) = 0 but qij(t + τij) > 0 for some
τij > 0. After time τij variable qij becomes non-zero and
stays that way forever (according to the argument we made
earlier in the proof). Then no qij escapes from the boundary
after time t+ τ∗, where τ∗ = maxi,j τij .
Now we prove the second part of the Lemma. Similar to
the previous argument, once the pj(t) > 0 on the invariant set,
pj(t+ τ) > 0 for all τ > 0. It remains to show that pj(t) > 0
on the invariant set. But, if pj(t) = 0 were true, then q˙ij > 0
would imply limt→∞ qij(t) =∞, which would violate (13).
4. Proof of Lemma 15 — Proof that Bp = E
Since Cq(t) = Cq∗ is a constant on VL, then taking the
time derivative of both sides gives Cq˙(t) = 0. Then:
0 = Cq˙(t) = CKˆq (f∗ −Ap(t))
⇔ CKˆqAp(t) = CKˆqf∗,
which means that CKˆqAp(t) equals a constant on the invari-
ant set. Taking the time derivative one more time yields
0 = CKˆqA ˙p(t) =CKˆqAKp
(
ATq(t)−Q)
⇔ CKˆqAKpATq(t) =CKˆqAKpQ = constant
Repeating the derivative operation 2n+ 1 times will yield
CKˆqA(KpAT KˆqA)np =CKˆqA(KpAT KˆqA)n−1KpAT Kˆqf∗,
= CKˆqADnp =CKˆqADn−1KpAT Kˆqf∗ = const
where we defined D = KpAT KˆqA. Note that Dn here stands
for “D to the nth power”. Let B = CKˆqA, then we can write:[
B BD · · · BDJ−1 ]T p(t) = Bp(t) = constant,
which completes the proof.
5. Proof of Lemma 17
Consider matrix D = KpAT KˆqA. It can be verified that
D =
 k
p
1(
∑
i∈I1 ki1) · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · kpJ(
∑
i∈IJ kiJ)

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(a)
= k

kp1 |I1| 0 · · · 0
0 kp2 |I2| · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · kpJ |IJ |
 ,
where Ij = {i ∈ I : qij(t) > 0} is the set of users of provider
j, where (a) follows from kqij = k. Without loss of generality,
take k = 1. Now, assuming that kpj ’s are not integer multiples
of each other, we can see that at most one row of D−λI can
be all-zero vector for any eigenvalue λ of D (indeed, exactly
one since D is a diagonal matrix). So, we can always choose
J − 1 rows of D − λI that are non-zero and also linearly
independent. An example of G′ is:

kp1 |I1| − λJ · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · kpJ−1|IJ−1| − λJ 0
kqi1ci11R+(qi1) · · · kqiJ−1ciJ−11R+(qiJ−1) kqiJciJ

Without loss of generality, assume that we choose rows 1
through J − 1 (i.e., we consider the J th eigenvalue λJ =
kpJ |IJ |). Now, consider matrix B′ = CKqA. It can be verified
that B′i,j = k
q
ijci,j . The entries of matrix B = CKˆ
qA are then
kqijcij1(0,∞)(qij(t)). Since qiJ(t) > 0 for at least one i = ıˆ,
kqıˆJcıˆJ1(0,∞)(qıˆJ(t)) = k
q
ıˆJcıˆJ , so the ıˆ row has an entry at
the J th column. We then append this row to the J−1 rows we
took from D − λJI, forming a submatrix of G, denoted G′.
The submatrix G′ is then a lower triangular matrix. Lower
triangular matrices have full rank, in this case J . Since the
submatrix of G has the full column rank, then G also has the
full column rank J . The procedure works in the same way for
any eigenvalue λj of D we may choose, since we can always
relabel the providers. This completes the proof.
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